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Developing countries are increasingly exporting fresh horticultural products to high-income countries.
These exports increasingly have to comply with stringent public and private standards, as well as other
quality and safety issues. There is an ongoing debate on the effect of private standards on the inclusion of
small-scale farmers in export supply chains. With this paper, we contribute to this debate by providing
new evidence from the Peruvian asparagus export sector, and by addressing several important method-
ological shortcomings and gaps in the existing literature. We describe export dynamics using a unique
firm level dataset on 567 asparagus export firms from 1993 to 2011 and the evolution of certification
to private standards using own survey data from a stratified random sample of 87 export firms. We
use an unbalanced panel of the surveyed companies on 19 years and several methods, including fixed
effects and GMM estimators, to estimate the causal impact of certification to private standards on com-
panies’ sourcing strategy. We find that certification leads to vertical integration and significantly reduces
the share of produce that is sourced from external producers, with a larger effect for small-scale produc-
ers. When distinguishing between production and processing standards, and between low-level and
high-level standards, we find that especially high-level production standards have a negative impact
on sourcing from (small-scale) producers.
 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Introduction
Standards are increasingly governing international food produc-
tion and trade. While public standards, set by public authorities,
mainly focus on food quality and safety issues, private standards,
set by private companies and non-state actors often add other as-
pects such as ethical or environmental concerns. Private standards
started to emerge at the end of the 1990s, mainly in response to
consumer concerns in high-income countries about food safety
and quality. The spread of private standards has been intensively
documented in the literature (e.g. Henson and Reardon, 2005;
Humphrey, 2008; Jaffee, 2003). Due to the expansion of agricul-
tural trade between industrialized and developing countries, pri-
vate standards have quickly become a global phenomenon,
influencing developing countries’ markets and producers (Jaffee
and Masakure, 2005; Reardon et al., 2001; Unnevehr, 2000). The
private nature of these standards creates a non-regulated area that
goes beyond the competence of national authorities and opens up
new debates on the legal dimensions as well as on the develop-
ment impacts of private standards (Marx et al., 2012).A major concern is that standards engender an unequal distri-
bution of the gains from trade because they lead to the exclusion
of the least developed countries and the poorest farmers, who
are unable to comply with stringent requirements due to a lack
of technical and financial capacity (Graffham et al., 2007; Maertens
and Swinnen, 2007; Reardon et al., 2001 or Swinnen and Vande-
plas, 2011; Vandemoortele et al., 2012 for theoretical notes). There
is a stream of empirical literature that focuses on the impact of pri-
vate standards on export volumes, either at the country level (e.g.
Anders and Caswell, 2009; Jongwanich, 2009; Wilson et al., 2003;
Wilson and Otsuki, 2003) or at the individual firm level (e.g. Schus-
ter and Maertens, 2013). A second stream of studies – to which this
paper will contribute – is addressing the issue of inclusion or
exclusion of smallholder and family farms as a result of increasing
standards (e.g. Henson et al., 2005; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009;
Reardon et al., 2009). Several studies have documented that with
increasing standards, a decreasing share of export produce is
sourced from small farmers. For example, Maertens and Swinnen
(2009) document a recent shift from smallholder contract farming
to vertically integrated farming on large-scale plantations in the
vegetable export sector in Senegal and attribute this shift to the
increased importance of standards. Gibbon (2003) observes that
increased exports of fresh produce from developing countries is
generally accompanied by a decline in the proportion of this
292 M. Schuster, M. Maertens / Food Policy 43 (2013) 291–305produce accounted for by smaller-scale producers. Several authors,
based on diverse empirical case-studies, have indicated that the
inclusion of family-type farms in high-standard trade and the
adoption of high standards by smallholder farms is only possible
through external interventions, e.g. development programs, pub-
lic–private partnerships or collective action support (e.g. Boselie
et al., 2003; Kersting and Wollni, 2012; Narrod et al., 2009; and
Okello et al., 2011). Blandon et al. (2009) indicate that producers’
traditional marketing preferences could impede them to partici-
pate in emerging supply chains, characterized by growing quality
requirements, and thus to take advantage of the potential opportu-
nities the modern chains offer. Contrariwise, a recent study on Afri-
can exporters by Henson et al. (2013) points to a complementary
rather than a competitive relationship between company own-
farm production and sourcing from smallholder farmers. Maertens
et al. (2012) provide a review of the literature on smallholder
inclusion/exclusion in high-standards horticultural export chains
in Africa. They conclude that the evidence is mixed, and that in
some sectors and countries standards have led to increased exclu-
sion of smallholder farms while in other sectors and countries
high-standards exports are largely realized by smallholder farmers.
With this paper, we contribute to this stream of empirical liter-
ature with a specific case-study and address several important
shortcomings and gaps in the existing studies. First, despite a large
body of literature on the participation of small producers in mod-
ernizing supply chains, remarkably few studies provide quantita-
tive evidence on the impact of standards. To the best of our
knowledge, no study has been able to effectively disentangle the
role of private food standards from a general trend of modernizing
value chains. Second, most studies focus on smallholder producers
and compare included versus excluded producers (e.g., Asfaw et al.,
2010; Chemnitz, 2007; Mausch et al., 2009; Subervie and Vagner-
on, 2013). This approach is useful to understand which farmers are
excluded/included and address issues of inequality but compli-
cates the identification of a causal link between private standards
and exclusion. Third, most studies use cross sectional farm data.
With such data it is impossible to look at dynamic trends, and dif-
ficult to control for selection bias and unobserved heterogeneity to
accurately estimate the effect of standards. Fourth, another limita-
tion in the existing literature is that surprisingly little attention is
given to the multiple scopes and types of private standard. The
existing literature either considers private standards as a homoge-
nous whole or focuses on specific main standards only (e.g. Henson
et al., 2011; Kersting and Wollni, 2012; and Lemeilleur, 2012 focus
on Global Gap only; Herzfeld et al., 2011 focus on BRC and Global
Gap). Yet, private standards are diverse (Humphrey, 2011). They
can apply to food processing and post farm-gate processes only
(i.e. HACCP, BRC, IFS etc.) or be concerned with farm-level produc-
tion (i.e. GAP, Global Gap, Tesco etc.). Some standards only cover
basic requirements, while others are more stringent.
The objective of this paper is to estimate the impact of certifica-
tion to private standards on the strategy of export companies1 to
source from external producers and small-scale farmers or to verti-
cally integrate. We focus on the Peruvian asparagus export sector
and provide empirical panel data evidence at the level of export
companies. The sector represents a unique case study from a scien-
tific perspective, due to the size of the industry with around 100
exporting firms per year, its long history, the availability of firm lon-
gitudinal data for the period 1993–2011, as well as the diversity of
adopted private standards. The availability of panel data for a large
set of companies and years allows us to hold country and sector spe-
cific aspects constant, to take into account sourcing trends, to correct1 The terms ‘‘export company’’ and ‘‘export firm’’ are used interchangeably
throughout this paper.for unobserved heterogeneity and company self-selection into pri-
vate standard schemes, and to distinguish between different types
of private standards. These are important methodological improve-
ments that allow us to more accurately estimate the impact of stan-
dards on sourcing from local and small-scale producers.
The structure of this paper is as follows: we first describe the
data used for the analysis and define the firm’s sampling strategy.
We then provide descriptive evidence on the evolution of export
quantities, the different types of private food certification schemes
and the sourcing behavior of firms. Further, we define our estima-
tion and identification strategy and report econometric results. We
conclude with policy implications and future research needs.Data
We use a unique firm level dataset on Peruvian asparagus ex-
ports constructed from secondary sources and own original data
collection. The secondary data include custom records (SUNAT –
Peru) at a transaction level on all fresh asparagus export transac-
tions over the period 1993–2011. This dataset contains informa-
tion on 567 fresh asparagus export firms and includes the
identification of the exporter (firm names and tax identification
number), the exported volume, the destination market and the
FOB value for all export transactions. Since virtually the entire
asparagus production in Peru is destined for export markets, the
customs data comprise the entire industry sales. We merge these
data with tax administration data, containing information on the
foundation date of the firms, core activities, general managers,
location, branches, as well as historical fiscal benefits or irregular-
ities. When companies are not exporting in a specific year, the ex-
port data are missing while the tax administration data are
available for all years in which the company is registered as being
active. In our dataset all companies are considered as ‘‘exporters’’
from the year they first export fresh asparagus and as long as they
are registered as an active company with the tax administration.
We substitute zeros with missing values for export volumes and
FOB values of the companies considered as ‘‘exporters’’.
We complement these secondary records with primary data
from a survey among a representative sample of export compa-
nies. From the total population of 567 firms that at least once
exported fresh asparagus between 1993 and 2011, we draw a
stratified random sample of 100 companies. We randomly se-
lected companies from three mutually exclusive strata, according
to the companies exporting experience in 2011: consolidated
companies with at least 6 years of exporting experience (total
population of 63 companies), intermediate companies, between
3 and 5 years of exporting experience (90 companies) and
start-up companies with less than 3 years of experiences (416
companies). Together consolidated and intermediate companies
are responsible for 88% of the volumes exported between 1993
and 2011 and are more likely to be certified to private standards
than start-up companies. These last companies, often only export
for a few years and then withdraw from the export sector. For
the analysis of dynamics in the Peruvian asparagus export sector,
consolidated and intermediated companies are more relevant,
and, therefore, we oversample companies in the first two strata.
The sample includes both companies that were operational in
2011, the year the survey was implemented, as well as compa-
nies that ceased operations by that year. This sampling strategy
ensures that the sample is representative not only for the cur-
rent situation but for the whole period. The survey was imple-
mented between July and September 2011 using an original
questionnaire including recall questions on the certification to
private food standards, sourcing strategies, ownership and
management structure, as well as on processing and production
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Fig. 1. Number of export firms (left vertical axis) and evolution of export volumes
(right vertical axis) for the period 1993–2011; for the population of 567 export
firms.
M. Schuster, M. Maertens / Food Policy 43 (2013) 291–305 293procedures. When export volumes are zero in a specific year, the
quantity sourced is set to missing. This leaves us with an unbal-
anced dataset but with an average of 6 time periods per com-
pany, of which 80% are consecutive (i.e., the missing
observations appear only at the end of each panel’s data).2
Descriptive statistics are partially drawn from secondary data,
including the whole population of 567 companies, and partially
from primary data, coming from the sample of 87 companies3
and including 44 consolidated companies, 27 intermediate compa-
nies and 16 start-up companies. In the latter case we use sam-
pling weights that put less weight on consolidated and
intermediate companies and more weight on start-up companies
to adjust for the stratified sampling design. In particular, we cal-
culated different weights for each year of the analysis according
to the number of consolidated, intermediate and start-up compa-
nies that were present in the entire population of export firms
and the number of firms that we had included in our sample.
Regressions are run on 84 out of the 87 surveyed companies,
due to missing values in the company covariates and on 70 com-
panies when lagged variables are used as instruments for current
variables.10
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Exports
Asparagus exports accounted for about 16% of total agricultural
exports in Peru in 2011. More than 220,000 mt (metric tons) are
produced yearly and practically the entire production is exported,
of which 70% as fresh produce (SUNAT, 2011). This makes Peru the
largest exporter of fresh asparagus worldwide. The main destina-
tion markets for fresh asparagus exports are the USA and the EU
(European Union).
The history of cultivation and export of asparagus from Peru
goes back to the 1950s, when imported seeds from California
(USA) were first planted in La Libertad region in Northern Peru.
Production and export did not expand considerably until the seeds
spread to the Ica region, located south of Lima, during the mid
1980s. The sector further expanded during the 1990s and 2000s,
with the sharpest growth in fresh produce exports during the early
years 2000 (Fig. 1). Export growth slowed down from 2006 on-
wards and experienced small fluctuations in subsequent years.
These export trends are likely related to a mixture of domestic pol-
icies and global market changes, such as the introduction of new
neo-liberal land policies promoting private investment in agricul-
ture in Peru (Diaz, 2007; O’Brien and Diaz, 2004; Shimizu, 2006),
increasing USD/Peruvian Nuevo Sol exchange rate fluctuations,4
shocks in international food market, and the global economic crisis.
The number of fresh asparagus export companies has evolved in
a similar manner. The number has tripled from around 40 compa-
nies at the end of the 1990s to almost 120 companies in 2006, and
remained at around 100 companies per year since 2006. The total
number of 567 companies from the custom database that ever ex-
ported fresh asparagus since 1993 indicates a large transition in
and out of exporting.2 We also did the analysis of this paper by balancing the panel and replacing the
variables related to sourcing strategies with zeros when a company was not exporting
one year. The main results do not change. We decide to report results in which zeros
refer to an actual choice of a company to produce the exported product instead of
buying it from external suppliers.
3 Due to field logistics 6 of the 100 sampled companies could not be interviewed,
while 7 surveyed companies only exceptionally export fresh asparagus and are
therefore dropped from the sample.
4 The USD was historically weak as compared to the Peruvian Nuevo Sol at the end
of the year 2007/beginning of 2008.Private standards
Private standards started to gain importance in the fresh aspar-
agus export sector in the year 2000 and certification to these stan-
dards has spread rapidly in the sector from then onwards. Fig. 2
shows, for our 87 sampled companies, the evolution of the number
of certified and non-certified companies over the period 1993–
2011. While until 1998 none of the companies was certified, certi-
fication takes off from the year 2000 and since 2006 the number of
certified companies exceeds that of non-certified companies.
Table 1 provides an overview of company certification to differ-
ent types of private standards in 2001, the year when standards
started to become relevant in the Peruvian asparagus sector, in
2006 and in 2011, the last year of observation in our dataset. Be-
tween 2001 and 2006 we witness a steep increase of the share of
certified firms, from almost zero to 50% of the companies. After this
first boost, the percent of certified firms reduced again, falling to
38% in 2011. The average number of certificates held by companies
with at least one certificate, also increased considerably and while
in 2001, no certified company complied to more than one certifica-
tion scheme, in 2011, certified companies held 2.5 certificates on
average. The comparison between the share of companies certified
and the average number of certificates per company indicates
there is a divide between the type of exporters, with some invest-
ing in multiple types of certifications and others not seeking certi-
fication at all.0
1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011
Year
Number certified firms Number non certified firms
Note: Sample of 87 export firms over 1993-2011
Source: Author's calculation based on SUNAT and survey data
Fig. 2. Evolution of the number of certified and non-certified export firms for the
period 1993–2011; for the sample of 87 surveyed export firms.
Table 1
Percentage of firms with specific certification schemes and number of certificates for certified firms (2001, 2006 and 2011). Source: Authors calculation based on own survey data.
Private certification scheme Firms in 2001 (N = 26) Firms in 2006 (N = 49) Firms in 2011 (N = 56)
Certification 7.1% 49.2% 37.8%
Number of certificates for certified firmsa 1(0.000) 1.745(0.944) 2.467(1.372)
Production certification 0 44.3% 34.6%
Number of production certificates for certified firmsa 0 0.899(0.306) 1.367(0.969)
Low level production certification 0 3.3% 3.2%
GAP 0 1.6% 2.1%
SQF1000 0 1.6% 1.1%
High level production certification 0 45% 34.6%
Global Gap 0 45% 34.6%
TESCO 0 5% 6.4%
LEAF 0 0 4.3%
Processing certification 7.1% 23.5% 25%
Number of processing certificates for certified firmsa 1(0.000) 0.134(0.347) 1.156(1.139)
Low level processing certification 7.1% 21.9% 16.2%
HACCP 3.6% 20.2% 14.1%
SQF2000 0 9.9% 7.7%
GMP 3.6% 6.6% 7.5%
High level processing certification 0 6.6% 16.5%
BRC 0 4.9% 15.4%
IFS 0 0 2.4%
Other
BASC 0 14.8% 15.2%
Values in bold and italics indicate supersets of the below listed certification schemes.
a Count variable: the numbers represent means and standard deviations in parenthesis.
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standards and into low and high level standards (Table 1). This
classification is based on the existing literature, with some small
adaptation to better fit the standards landscape in the Peruvian
asparagus sector. Codron et al. (2005) and Henson and Humphrey
(2010) categorize private standards according to the vertical scope
or the extension along the value chain. In line with this, we distin-
guish between pre-farm gate or production standards, focussing on
agricultural production, and post-farm gate or processing stan-
dards, focussing on processing, handeling and distribution. The
same authors also distinguish between baseline or low-level stan-
dard schemes and premium or high-level schemes. The latter are
designed to establish superior attributes and differentiate prod-
ucts, while the former are not designed to establish the uniqueness
of particular products but aimed at meeting required minimum
levels of performance. We take a slightly different approach and
classify low- and high-level standards according to the stringency
of the requirements, as stated by the surveyed companies. Export
companies perceive GAP, SQF, HACCP and GMP as low-level stan-
dards because they entail lower requirements and demand less0
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Fig. 3. Share of exported asparagus sourced from all external producers and from
small producers (610 ha) for the period 1996–2011; for the population of 567
export firms.company investments. Global Gap, TESCO, LEAF, BRC and IFS are
perceived as high-level standards due to the larger time, physical,
as well as human capital (e.g., training) investments they need.
BASC certification, mainly required by the US, is classified as a sep-
arate standard, due to its intrinsic aim of promoting safe interna-
tional trade and protecting from bioterrorism and drug trafficking.
The figures in Table 1 reveal that, while the first private stan-
dards in the sector were processing standards, production stan-
dards spread more rapidly during the early years 2000s. By 2006,
44% of the sampled export companies had at least one production
certificate and nearly 24% a processing certificate. The spread of
processing standards increased further to 25% in 2011 while the
spread of production standards decreased over time, to 35% in
2011. The spread of production standards mainly concerns high-le-
vel standards, in particular Global Gap. The overall raise of process-
ing standards over time is first due to low-level certifications (in
2006) and then to high level certifications (2011), and results are
mainly driven by the two main low and high-level types of certifi-
cations, i.e. HACCP and BRC. Companies can either choose to di-
rectly adopt high-level standards, or to first adopt lower
standards and then to upgrade to higher standards.
Sourcing strategies
The exported fresh asparagus is either produced by the export
companies themselves (own supply) on owned or rented land5 or
sourced from external producers – or a combination of both. Fig. 3
shows that, in the period 1996–2011, the share of produce that
was sourced from external producers decreased over time. In the late
1990s, 50–60% of the total export volume was sourced from external
producers, while by 2011 this figure had dropped to 35%. This down-
ward trend might be related to a new agricultural promotion law
that was introduced in 2000. This law provided asparagus exporters
with tax advantages and lower cost burdens on hired employees,65 Ninety percent of the companies with own primary production of asparagus own
the cultivated land, while only 10% is renting in land for asparagus production. This is
mainly due to the large land availabilities in the Peruvian coastal areas where
asparagus is produced.
6 Ley de Promoción del Sector Agrario – Ley No. 27360.
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interesting.
The external asparagus producers are not a homogenous group
of farmers, and we can make a distinction between small and large
producers. The farm size of asparagus producers who are not di-
rectly exporting varies between 1 and 200 hectares (ha). In their
2005 census, the Peruvian Institute of Asparagus and Horticultural
Goods (IPEH) estimated that at the national level there are around
1576 asparagus producers, of which 82% or 1300 producers are
small producers with less than 10 ha of asparagus land. The
remaining 276 are large producers cultivating between 11 and
50 ha (11.29%), between 51 and 100 ha (3.24%) or more than
100 ha (2.98%).7 Small producers with only few and little asparagus
plots are very different from large producers managing tens or even
hundreds of hectares. The former are highly informal, heavily rely on
family and informal labor input, use traditional production tech-
niques, and frequently plant asparagus as cash and export crop next
to crops for the local market and for own consumption. The latter are
often registered farms, participating in formal labor markets, adopt-
ing modern inputs and technologies, and operating in a business ori-
ented manner. Around 80% of all sourcing relationships between
export companies and producers rely on agreements in which quan-
tities, deadlines and reference prices are mentioned. While written
contracts exist between export companies and larger farmers, oral
agreement are very common in sourcing relationships with small
producers. For the remainder of the analysis we distinguish between
small producers with 10 ha or less and large producers with more
than 10 ha.8 Fig. 3 shows that in more recent years, about 6% of
the total volume of exported asparagus are sourced from small pro-
ducers while in the late 1990s this was 10–15%.
A decreasing share of export produce that is sourced from exter-
nal producers, and from small producers in particular, does not
necessarily mean that the absolute volumes of sourced produce
are decreasing as well, given a very sharp increase in total export
volumes. In Fig. 4, we look at the total volume of exported produce
from exporters’ own supply and the volume that is sourced from
small or medium and large producers. The figure shows that the
sharp export growth since the early years 2000s has mainly been
driven by an increase in vertically integrated production by export
companies themselves. However, also the total volume of export
produce sourced from medium and large external producers has
increased, be it at a lower and slightly more irregular pace. The
quantity sourced from small producers has increased as well but
at a much lower pace.
In order to better interpret the above graphs and the forces driv-
ing companies to adopt a certain sourcing strategy, in Table 2 we
summarize companies’ answers on an open question asking for
the reasons behind their sourcing strategy. More than one fourth
of all companies declare that the main reason for producing their
own asparagus is to assure a certain quality of the exported good,
while almost 17% mention the production of constant volumes
which guarantees a continuous export flow. Another 10% of all
companies has had or fears for negative experiences with external
producers, in particular concerning eventual disloyal behaviors or
contract breaching. Other reasons mentioned, include a lower
work burden, a better traceability and higher formality or an in-
creased cost efficiency and easier programming. Some other com-
panies see own production as a first starting point in the export
business or as a way of being more independent. Out of the com-
panies sourcing from external producers, nearly 23% state that they
are bound to do so due to lacking capital to invest in own fields or7 II Censo Nacional de Productores de Espárragos – IPEH.
8 N.B. in this paper we are explicitly dealing with export crop producers, which
have been shown not to be among the poorest and smallest farmers, but to be among
an already selected group of the better-off farmers (Maertens and Swinnen, 2007).technologies, 15% mention their need to satisfy their buyers with
sufficient produce and around 10% their lacking experience in the
production business. Minor reasons forcing companies to source
from other producers are water limitations, plague on own fields
or the political instability. Another – smaller – group of companies
seems to explicitly choose to source at least part of their export
volumes from external producers in order to more flexibly manage
their exports (mentioned by almost 19% of all companies), to sup-
port small producers’ businesses (8%), to fill their processing plant
capacity (6%) or diversify their export portfolio (4%). Minor reasons
mentioned in this case were the focus on a different firm activity,
risk managing or learning strategies.
An increase of the importance of certification to private food
standards has an effect on both the required quality and the cost
structure of the companies, (i.e., requiring higher fixed and variable
capital investments), which were both mentioned as main factors
driving companies to opt for a certain procurement system. We
could thus expect that certification, provided that companies have
the financial capacities, could lead them to choose a more verti-
cally integrated production structure. In the next sub-section we
will explore whether there exists some descriptive evidence for a
correlation between sourcing strategies and certification to private
food standards.
Certification and sourcing strategies
Fig. 5 shows, for our 87 sampled companies, the evolution of
sourcing strategies of certified and non-certified companies. Until
1998 none of the companies was certified and the average share
of produce sourced from external producers was around 60%.
When certification starts to play a role in the Peruvian asparagus
export market we notice a divergence in the sourcing trends be-
tween certified and non-certified companies. After a period of
adaptation between 1998 and 2005, certified companies sourced
on average 20% of produce from external producers while non-cer-
tified companies sourced on average between 60% and 80% of
produce.
In order to shed more light on the link between the adoption of
private standards and firm’s sourcing strategy, Fig. 6 shows the
evolution of the average share of produce sourced from external
and small producers for certified firms before and after the first
year of certification. The decrease of the average percent sourced
from both all producers and small producers in the year of certifi-
cation is striking. The percentage sourced from all types of produc-
ers increases again after two years, but never reaches the levels
Table 2
Reasons for exporters to rely on own supply or source from external producers. Source: Authors’ calculation based on survey data.
Companies relying on own supply of asparagus (N = 58)a Companies relying on sourcing asparagus from external producers (N = 76)b
Reasons for relying in own supply Percentagec Reasons for relying on sourcing from external producers Percentagec
Guaranteed quality 27.08 Lack of capital 22.92
Guaranteed volumes 16.67 Higher flexibility 18.75
Bad experience with sourcing/contract breaching 10.42 Need to satisfy buyers 14.58
Lower work burden 8.33 Lack of experience 10.42
Traceability of produce 8.33 Support small producers 8.33
Cost efficiency 6.25 Fill processing plant capacity 6.25
Higher formality 6.25 Diversify production 4.17
Start-up strategy 6.25 Water limitation 2.08
Easier programming/monitoring 4.17 Political instability 2.08
Independence 4.17 Asparagus is not the core activity 2.08
Main external producer dropped them 2.08 Plague in own fields 2.08
First learning with others’ produce 2.08
Reduce risks 2.08
a This includes all companies that ever used own supply, and includes 35 companies who use(d) both own supply and sourcing from external producers.
b This includes all companies that ever sourced from external producers, and includes 35 companies who use(d) both own supply and sourcing from external producers.
c Sampling weights are used to calculate percentages.
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Fig. 6. Evolution of the average share of produce sourced from all external and from
small producers (<10 ha) before and after the first year of certification (year 0); for a
sample of 45 surveyed export firms that ever got certified between 1993 and 2011.
296 M. Schuster, M. Maertens / Food Policy 43 (2013) 291–305previous to certification (average of 35% previous to certification as
compared to a 24% after certification), while the percentage
sourced from small producers remains relatively constant below
the 10% threshold. Since the first year of certification differs across
companies, the observed decrease in external sourcing around the
year of certification points to changes in companies’ sourcing strat-
egy that are closely linked to certification.Company characteristics
In Table 3 we describe the characteristics of asparagus export
companies. We distinguish between time varying, i.e., changing
from one year to another, and time constant characteristics and
show summary statistics for the variables that will be used in fur-
ther analyses. We again report descriptive statistics for the years
2001, 2006 and 2011.
In 2001 export volumes are larger for non-certified than for cer-
tified companies, but this trend is reversed in 2006 and 2011, when
certified companies export significantly larger volumes than non-
certified companies.9 Mainly green asparagus are exported from
Peru but the small share of white asparagus in total exports, mainly
comes from certified companies. The probability of owning aspara-9 In Schuster and Maertens (2013) the relationship between certification to private
food standards and export volumes is specifically addressed.gus land or a processing plant and the size of the cultivated land
are higher for certified than for non-certified companies across the
three years. Certified companies are relatively older, especially in
2011, and more frequently owned by foreign and non-agricultural
capital. In addition, the number of companies exporting under two
distinct company names was slightly higher for non-certified com-
panies in 2001 and 2006, but this decreased substantially by 2011.
The affiliation to a favorable governmental tax-paying regime is
higher for certified companies in both 2006 and 2011, which indi-
cates a higher formality among certified firms. Managerial or organi-
zational changes do not considerably change over time and are not
very different between certified and non-certified companies. Final-
ly, the location of certified and non-certified companies changes
slightly over time; while in 2001 non certified companies were more
common in Ica and Ancash as compared to non-certified companies,
this trend is reversed in 2011.
The descriptive statistics in this section show that since the
raise of private standards in Peru at the start of the 2000s, there
have been important time trends in the typology of adopted stan-
dards, in the nature of export companies and their sourcing strat-
egies. Whether the decreasing time trend and the observed
differences in sourcing behavior between certified and non-certi-
fied firms can be attributed to the effect of private certifications
is still questionable. Confounding factors can influence both the
decision to get certified and to reduce the dependency on external
Table 3
Company characteristics, by certification – 2001, 2006 and 2011. Source: Authors’ calculation based on survey data.
Variables Description Time
varying
2001 2006 2011
Certified
companies
(N = 2)
Non certified
companies
(N = 24)
Certified companies
(N = 26)
Non certified
companies
(N = 23)
Certified
companies
(N = 34)
Non certified
companies
(N = 22)
Export volume Exported volume
in metric tons
(mt)
Yes 836.75(888.16) 1356.727(1622.74) 2156.717(2614.716) 689.23(837.19) 2664.22(4032.2) 828.12(1222.65)
Green
asparagus
% Of green (with
respect to white)
asparagus
exported
Yes 100(0.000) 93.847(20.977) 88.352(25.632) 90.409(26.818) 86.313(39.723) 99.038(5.222)
Asparagus land
– dummy
=1 If owns a
asparagus land
Yes 1(0.000) 0.417(0.506) 0.827(0.400) 0.186(0.377) 0.924(0.348) 0.327(0.381)
Asparagus land
– ha
= Hectars of
asparagus land
cultivated by the
company
Yes 39.2(0.000) 11.541(20.651) 32.474(45.108) 3.199(9.109) 52.860(86.337) 3.633(6.574)
Processing
plant
=1 If owns a
processing plant
Yes 1(0.000) 0.477(0.508) 0.778(0.436) 0.441(0.482) 0.846(0.462) 0.282(0.361)
Years since
foundation
Number of years
since foundation
year
Yes 8 (1.061) 5.592(2.924) 8.707(4.365) 5.990(4.166) 13.106(6.056) 4.991(3.051)
Foreign capital =1 If owned by
foreign capital
Yes 0.5(0.531) 0.153(0.366) 0.455(0.522) 0.204(0.392) 0.443(0.636) 0.381(0.389)
Non
agricultural
capital
=1 If starting
capital comes
from non agric
business
No 0.5(0.531) 0.229(0.427) 0.300(0.481) 0.032(0.172) 0.330(0.602) 0.175(0.305)
Double Tax ID =1 If company
exports with >1
tax ID number
Yes 0(0.000) 0.08(0.275) 0.067(0.262) 0.097(0.288) 0.028(0.212) 0(0.000)
Taxpayer
Regime
=1 If affiliated to
favored taxpayer
regime
Yes 0(0.000) 0(0.000) 0.300(0.481) 0(0.000) 0.346(0.609) 0.034(0.146)
Agriculture
core
business
=1 If agriculture is
the core business
No 0.5(0.531) 0.576(0.502) 0.622(0.509) 0.429(0.481) 0.591(0.629) 0.312(0.371)
Management
change
= If company
experiences a
change in the
management
Yes 0(0.000) 0.0382(0.195) 0.100(0.315) 0.14(0.337) 0.028(0.221) 0.091(0.232)
Organizational
change
=1 If company
experiences an
internal
organizational
change
Yes 0(0.000) 0.04(0.199) 0.149(0.375) 0.100(0.291) 0.028(0.221) 0.027(0.131)
Ancash =1 If company
operates in the
Ancash region
No 0(0.000) 0.118(0.328) 0.266(0.463) 0.107(0.301) 0.057(0.295) 0(0.000)
Ica =1 If company
operates in the Ica
region
No 0.5(0.531) 0.691 (0.470) 0.534(0.523) 0.591(0.478) 0.641(0.614) 0.556(0.398)
La Libertad =1 If company
operates in La
Libertad region
No 0(0.000) 0.076 (0.270) 0.134(0.357) 0.129(0.326) 0.246(0.551) 0.329(0.377)
Lima = If company
operates in the
Lima region
No 0.5(0.531) 0.038 (0.195) 0.033(0.188) 0.172(0.367) 0.028(0.212) 0.115(0.255)
Means and standard deviations in parenthesis. All sample weights are weighted for the population average to control for the oversampling of consolidated and intermediate
companies.
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ods to deal with this empirical question and discuss the estimation
results.
Econometric approach
Model specification
Our main goal is to determine the causal effect of certification to
private food standards on the sourcing strategy of export firms. We
estimate regressions of the following type:Sit ¼ b0 þ b1Cit þ b2Xit þ Dt þ v i þ uit ð1Þ
where Sit is the proportion of asparagus sourced from an external
producer by company i in year t or alternatively the proportion
sourced from small producers. The key variable of interest in the
model is certification of company i in year t (Cit). In order to take
the multiplicity of certification types into account, Cit is alterna-
tively defined as 1/ a dummy variable for certification (equaling
one if company i is certified in year t), 2/ a vector of two dummy
variables for certification to processing and production standards,
3/ a vector of four dummy variables for certification to a low- and
10 A two-way tobit could have been an alternative in our case, but was found
suboptimal as the two extreme values at zero and one are real observations and not a
result of censoring.
11 To the best of our knowledge, only Wooldridge (2010) has dealt with the issue in
a recent working paper, but further empirical applications are scarce.
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four dummy variables for certification to the most important indi-
vidual private standards in the Peruvian asparagus export sector
(Global Gap, HACCP, BRC and BASC). The vector Xit is a large set of
observable firm characteristics. These include variables related to
the type and the size of companies, their experience, their assets,
their access to capital, tax pay regimes, management changes, and
their location. These variables are described in Table 2. The aspara-
gus land size might be endogenous in the model; we therefore use
lagged variables of land or explicitly deal with the potential endoge-
neity biases. Finally, year dummies Dt are included to control for
common macro-economic effects, vi is a time constant unobserv-
able firm-specific effect and uit is the time-varying error term.
Identification and estimation methods
The estimation of our model entails two major complications.
First, our main independent variable of interest Ci is potentially
endogenous. This endogeneity could arise from 1/ time constant
unobserved company characteristics which can both be correlated
with the company’s sourcing and certification preferences, 2/ a
feed-back reaction of past sourcing shocks or behaviors on the
adoption of certification, and 3/ time and company specific unob-
servable shocks simultaneously affecting sourcing and certification
decisions.
The panel nature of our data rather easily allows us to deal with
the first source of endogeneity and to remove the time invariant
unobserved firm characteristics (vi) by including company fixed ef-
fects in the regression analysis. The demeaning operation does not
however allow us to deal with the second potential source of end-
ogeneity caused by a feed-back reaction. Such a reaction could be
either due to an ‘anticipation effect’, i.e., a behavioral change of
companies in reaction to future certification plans, or a ‘response
effect’, i.e., the fact that firms seek certification in response to
changes in pre-period sourcing strategies. Both would engender a
correlation between the certification variable and the error term,
which would lead to biased estimates from Eq. (1). An ‘anticipation
effect’ would certainly lead to a downward bias of the estimated
certification coefficients b1. This is likely true for the ‘response ef-
fect’ as well if past negative shocks to sourcing positively affect the
likelihood of certification. We test for the endogeneity and antici-
pation assumptions by including the lead of the certification vari-
able as a additional regressor in Eq. (1) and by inverting the
equation to analyze the effects of one- and two period lagged
sourcing strategies on the decision of certification. Results are
shown and discussed in Table B1 of Appendix.
Further, in order to exclude every type of endogeneity arising
from feed-back reactions or simultaneity issues, we resort to the
General Method of Moments (GMM) approach of Arellano and
Bond, 1991. This approach deals with the above unobserved heter-
ogeneity and endogeneity problems by combining a first difference
transformation with an instrumental variable estimation strategy.
The within transformation eliminates the fixed firm characteristics
vi, while, to get rid of the endogeneity problem, lagged levels of the
explanatory variables are used as instruments in the first-differ-
enced equation (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Bond, 2002). We are
able to use this methodology on 70 companies that consecutively
export fresh asparagus for an average of six time periods per com-
pany. For the choice of the instruments it is important to ascertain
whether the explanatory variables are strictly exogenous, prede-
termined or endogenous, i.e. to respectively be independent or de-
pend on past or current export performance. Only time dummies
are treated as strictly exogenous, while certification variables, ex-
port volumes and the total cultivated asparagus land are treated
as endogenous. All remaining firm-specific characteristics are as-
sumed to be predetermined. We consider this to be the most rea-sonable assumption, as, except for the eventually simultaneous
certification and quick adjustment of export volumes and land cul-
tivation, the adaptation of other firm characteristics to changes in
the sourcing strategy is not immediate.
Second, an additional complication relates to the non- linear
nature of the dependent variable, corresponding to the proportion
of produce sourced from external producers. This variable is neces-
sarily bounded between zero and one, and standard linear estima-
tion techniques might not provide accurate estimates, as the
predicted values cannot be guaranteed to lie in the unit interval.
This type of regression falls into the class of models known as gen-
eral linear models (GLM). Papke and Wooldridge (1996) developed
a fractional probit estimator by following a quasi-maximum likeli-
hood approach.10 This approach has been typically used to estimate
fractional outcomes, but the need to control for firm fixed effects
complicates the choice of an estimator. Unobservable firm effects
cannot be conditioned out of the likelihood model by including firm
dummies, as this approach would introduce an incidental parameter
problem undermining the consistency of all covariates (Greene,
2004). Papke and Wooldridge (2008) propose a solution for bal-
anced, but not for unbalanced panel datasets. Due to the frequent
entry and exit of firms in our dataset, Papke and Wooldridge’s
(2008) approach cannot be used in our situation and the remaining
existing literature has not yet convincingly come up with a solu-
tion.11 In any case, an important shortcoming of all non-linear esti-
mation approaches mentioned above is that they assume strictly
exogenous covariates. Even if the strict exogeneity is conditional
on vi in case of the fractional response model for panel data, it would
not allow us to get rid of eventual endogeneities due to feed-back or
simultaneity in the certification and the sourcing strategy decisions.
We therefore use a linear approach to estimate Eq. (1) as it al-
lows us to deal more effectively with issues of endogeneity and
unobserved firm heterogeneity. Moreover, Papke and Wooldridge
(2008) show that even if the linear approximation misses some
of the nonlinear effects at more extreme values, it does a good
job in estimating the average effects of interest. As additional check
we only report results from the fractional probit estimator (GLM),
as first used by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) and which corre-
sponds to the non-linear counterpart of the simple OLS estimation
methods.Results and discussion
Certification to private food standard
In Table 4 we report regression results on the percentage of pro-
duce sourced from external producers in general, and in Table 5 on
sourcing from small-scale producers in particular. Both tables in-
clude results from 1/ a simple OLS regression (column 1); 2/ a
GLM regression in which we control for the non linearity of the
dependent variable (column 2); 3/ a fixed effects model in which
we control for unobserved company heterogeneity (column 3);
and 4/ an Arellano-Bond GMM estimation in which we control
for the potential endogeneous character of certification, export vol-
ume and total asparagus land (column 4). The number of observa-
tions drops in the fourth model, as some companies present export
gaps. Test results for the null hypotheses of no second order auto-
correlation of residuals and of the joint validity of all instruments
for the difference GMM estimation (Hansen test – overidentifica-
tion restrictions) are shown at the bottom of the tables. All tests
Table 4
Regression results – Dep var: Sourcing from all external producers.
OLS GLM Fixed effects Difference GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Certification 0.319*** 0.263*** 0.061* 0.202*
(0.072) (0.053) (0.036) (0.114)
Processing plant 0.041 0.021 0.071* 0.101**
(0.062) (0.058) (0.040) (0.041)
Lag (total asparagus land) 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Total asparagus land 0.002*
(0.001)
Foreign capital 0.061 0.039 0.154*** 0.145*
(0.067) (0.054) (0.042) (0.079)
Green asparagus 0.003** 0.002** 0.003 0.194
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.219)
Log (export volumes) 0.018* 0.018** 0.008 0.013
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.015)
Years exporting 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010)
Double tax ID 0.117 0.110 0.036*** 0.007
(0.118) (0.085) (0.013) (0.031)
Administrative change 0.014 0.026 0.018 0.016
(0.038) (0.031) (0.022) (0.013)
Organizational change 0.037 0.053 0.022 0.013
(0.045) (0.042) (0.020) (0.032)
Taxpayer regime 0.017 0.058 0.012 0.048
(0.044) (0.043) (0.035) (0.103)
Agricultural core business 0.386*** 0.323***
(0.058) (0.036)
Non agricultural starting capital 0.135** 0.117**
(0.057) (0.052)
Constant 0.867*** 0.424
(0.173) (0.347)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location dummies Yes Yes – –
R2 0.57 – 0.529 –
N 485 485 485 391
Number of collapsed IV’s – – – 46
2nd order autocorrelation – – – 0.745
Hansen difference test – – – 0.869
Company cluster robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Average marginal effects (APE) are reported in column 2.
*** p < 0.01.
** p < 0.05.
* p < 0.1.
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confirms the validity of the instruments used. In all regressions
we control for the set of covariates described in Table 2.
Our main result is that certification to private standards
changes companies sourcing strategies, and significantly reduces
the share of produce they source from external suppliers in general
and from small-scale suppliers in particular. We find significant
negative effects of certification on external sourcing (Table 4)
and on small-scale sourcing (Table 5) across the different estima-
tion techniques. For small-scale sourcing, the estimated effects
are around 11 percentage points and are quantitatively very simi-
lar across the models (Table 5). This might indicate that unob-
served firm characteristics and simultaneity bias are not
important in this case. For external sourcing, however, the magni-
tude of the estimated effects are quite different across the models.
The estimated coefficient in the simple linear OLS model indicates
an effect of 32 percentage points (column 1, Table 4) and the esti-
mated average marginal effect in the GLM model indicates an ef-
fect of 26 percentage points (column 2, Table 4). These estimates
are substantially larger than the estimates from the fixed effects
model, resulting in an effect of 6 percentage points (column 3, Ta-
ble 4). This indicates that simple OLS and GLM estimations overes-
timate the effect of certification because of unobserved firm
characteristics. However, the results from the GMM estimationindicate an effect of 20 percentage points (column 4, Table 4),
which is again larger than in the fixed effects estimation and which
can be explained by anticipation or response effects that lead to a
downward bias in the fixed effect estimation. We believe the GMM
estimation gives quantitatively the most credible results as it ac-
counts for different sources of endogeneity bias.
When comparing the results from the GMM estimations on
external sourcing and on small-scale sourcing (columns 4, Tables
4 and 5), we find a large difference in the magnitude of the effect
of certification. Given that the average sourcing from external pro-
ducers across all companies and years is 54%, the GMM estimate of
20 percentage point reduction corresponds to an average decrease
of 37% in sourcing from external producers. Likewise, the average
sourcing from small-scale producers is 15% and the estimated ef-
fect for small-scale sourcing is 11 percentage points, corresponding
to an average decrease of 73% in sourcing from small-scale produc-
ers. Hence, private standards reduce sourcing from small-scale
producers by twice as much as sourcing from external producers
in general.
These results are in line with the existing descriptive and qual-
itative evidence in the literature, that with increasing standards, a
decreasing share of export products is sourced from small farmers
(e.g. Gibbon, 2003; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009). The econometric
results are also supported by the descriptive results from Sectoral
Table 5
Regression results – Dep var: Sourcing from small producers.
OLS GLM Fixed effects Difference GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Certification 0.114** 0.113** 0.118** 0.107**
(0.048) (0.045) (0.049) (0.048)
Processing plant 0.045 0.045 0.018 0.015
(0.064) (0.050) (0.047) (0.052)
Lag (Total asparagus land) 0.001 0.001* 0.001
0.000 (0.001) 0.000
Total asparagus land 0.001
(0.001)
Foreign capital 0.062 0.061 0.207*** 0.163**
(0.041) (0.040) (0.058) (0.069)
Green asparagus 0 0.000 0.007 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003)
Log (export volumes) 0.01 0.009 0.008 0.001
(0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013)
Years exporting 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.002
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006)
Double tax ID 0.033 0.013 0.042** 0.089*
(0.074) (0.067) (0.018) (0.046)
Administrative change 0.022 0.024 0.022 0.009
(0.033) (0.029) (0.019) (0.018)
Organizational change 0.053 0.057 0.016 0.018
(0.035) (0.038) (0.025) (0.021)
Taxpayer regime 0.035 0.032 0.03 0.01
(0.046) (0.064) (0.043) (0.094)
Agricultural core business 0.016 0.006
(0.052) (0.046)
Non agricultural starting capital 0.108* 0.115*
(0.059) (0.070)
Constant 0.31 0.245
(0.226) (0.397)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location dummies Yes Yes – –
R2 0.495 – 0.514 –
N 485 485 485 391
Number of collapsed IV’s – – – 49
2nd Order autocorrelation – – – 0.098
Hansen difference test – – – 0.869
Company cluster robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Average marginal effects (APE) are reported in column 2.
*** p < 0.01.
** p < 0.05.
* p < 0.1.
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ven by quality and traceability requirements in more than one
third of the cases (see Table 2). The negative effect of certification
to private standards on external sourcing can be explained by an
increased cost burden of export companies to monitor and control
quality and other product attributes that might be difficult to ver-
ify with external producers. The small, informal and scattered nat-
ure of small producers makes supervision by the exporting
company even more complex and costly, which explains the larger
negative effect of certification on sourcing from small-scale
farmers.
The R2 of the OLS and FE models indicate that 50% of the vari-
ability is explained by the model. A main part of the variability is
captured by location and time fixed effects, but the results in Ta-
bles 4 and 5 reveal that some other firm characteristics have an im-
pact on firms’ sourcing strategy as well. First, the ownership of a
processing plant and of agricultural land affects companies sourc-
ing strategies. In the fixed effects and GMM model the ownership
of an asparagus processing plant has a positive and significant ef-
fect on the percentage sourced from external producers in general
but not from small-scale producers. This might be related to the
amortization of processing costs, which require firms to increase
or at least maintain a certain level of processed volume and there-
fore to increase sourcing from medium and large producers. The(lagged) total asparagus land owned by a company has a robust
negative, although small effect on sourcing: each hectare of land
cultivated by the company, reduces the percentage of sourced
product by around 0.1–0.3 percentage points. The effect is slightly
smaller and less significant on smallholder sourcing, indicating
that the sourcing from smallholders depends less on merely the
amount of product that a company can produce on its own, but
is related to a strategic diversification of the product procurement.
This result is in line with a recent work by Henson et al. (2013)
who find that sourcing from small producers facilitates the spread
of risks and a better management of the demand.
Second, when the company is owned by foreign capital or when
the starting capital is non-agricultural, companies source less from
external producers in general and from small producers in partic-
ular. Foreign investors and companies that started their asparagus
export activity with non-agricultural capital thus prefer to verti-
cally integrate, but also have a preference for large producers. This
is likely to be due to a weaker relationship with the local commu-
nities and therefore with – especially small – external producers.
Third, the total export volume has a negative effect on external
sourcing while the share of green asparagus in the total volume has
a positive effect. These effects are only significant for sourcing in
general – and not for small-scale sourcing – and only in the OLS
and GLS models. Total export volume might be highly correlated
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dwindling of the effect in the fixed effects and GMM models, and
the absence of a significant effect in the models on small-scale
sourcing where unobserved effects are less important. The positive
effect of green asparagus is likely to be related to a more cost-effi-
cient and less technically demanding production system as com-
pared to white asparagus that is produced only be a few large
companies.
Production versus processing standards
In what follows we distinguish between different types of stan-
dards, considering the categorization of private standards laid
down above (see Table 1). We estimate the impact of certification
to production and processing standards and to high-level and low-
level standards on companies sourcing from external producers in
general and small producers in particular. The results of are re-
ported in Tables 6 and 7 respectively and include results of OLS,
GLM, fixed effects and GMM estimations. In these regression we
control for the same set of covariates as in Tables 4 and 5 but we
only report the results for the certification variables as the esti-
mated coefficients for the other covariates are the same.
A first important result from Table 6 is that the negative effect
of certification on external sourcing only holds for production stan-
dards and not for processing standards. In particular, we find that
certification to production standards has a significant negative ef-
fect on external sourcing and on small-scale sourcing in all regres-
sion models while certification to processing standards has a
positive effect on external sourcing and a negative effect on
small-scale sourcing, albeit only significant in the fixed effects
and/or GMM estimations. When considering the preferred GMM
estimation, we find that certification to private production stan-
dards significantly decreases external sourcing by 24 percentage
points (i.e., 44%), and small-scale sourcing by 9.2 percentage points
(i.e., 61.3%); whereas certification to processing standards signifi-
cantly increases external sourcing by 14 percentage points (i.e.,
25%), but has no significant impact on sourcing from small-scale
farmers.
The heterogeneous effects can be explained by the nature of dif-
ferent certification schemes. Production standards impose restric-
tions on the pre-farm gate treatment of a product and thus on
the cultivation and harvesting procedures which are typically man-
aged by producers themselves. The origin of a raw product and theTable 6
Regression results – production versus processing certification.
Dep Var: Sourcing from all producers
OLS GLM Fixed effect
(1a) (2a) (3a)
Production certification 0.431*** 0.347*** 0.180***
(0.071) (0.050) (0.057)
Processing certification 0.06 0.052 0.087*
(0.044) (0.042) (0.051)
Company covariates Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Location dummies Yes – –
R2 0.614 – 0.516
N 485 485 485
No. of collapsed IV’s – – –
2nd order autocorrelation – – –
Hansen Difference test – – –
Company cluster robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Average marginal effects (APE) are reported in columns 2a and 2b.
*** p < 0.01.
** p < 0.05.
* p < 0.1.control over the production stage therefore matters in this case,
which translates into a negative effect on external sourcing. Com-
panies reduce their external sourcing to more easily control the
compliance with the quality and traceability requirements of the
production standards. Processing standards impose restrictions
on product handling, but do not interfere with the origin of the
raw product. In order to amortize the costs related to the certifica-
tion process, firms need large volumes and reliable supply of raw
produce and might therefore increases sourcing from external pro-
ducers. As compared to sourcing from medium and large produc-
ers, sourcing from small producers only provides limited volumes
in more informal business relationships, which is likely less cost
effective for creating a guaranteed supply; it is therefore not af-
fected by processing standards. These findings are in line with
the descriptive statistics of Sectoral analysis that companies verti-
cally integrate to guarantee quality and traceability, but source
from external producers to fill their own processing plant capaci-
ties (see Table 2). Also the fact that owning a processing plant
has a significant positive effect on external sourcing (see Table 4)
but not on small-scale sourcing (see Table 5) supports the findings
here. A fixed cost in processing capacity positively affects sourcing
from all, but small, producers.
In Table 7, we further distinguish between baseline and high-le-
vel standards. First, we find that the negative effect of production
certification on external sourcing only holds for high-level produc-
tion standards and not for baseline production standards. This re-
sult holds for all regression models and for sourcing from all
types of external producers and from small-scale producers. Sec-
ond, considering the preferred GMM estimator, we find that both
baseline and high-level processing standards have no significant
effect on sourcing from small-scale producer (column 4b) but they
have opposing effects on sourcing from any type of external pro-
ducer (column 4a). Baseline processing standards have a significant
positive effect on external sourcing and the estimated effect of 27
percentage points is substantially larger than the estimated effect
of processing certification overall that was estimated at 14 per-
centage points (see Table 6). High-level processing standards have
a significant negative effect and decrease external sourcing by 17
percentage points. This indicates that firms increase their pro-
cessed volumes by purchasing from medium and large scale pro-
ducers in order to amortize the costs related to the certification
process, but only if the processing requirements are not too strin-
gent. As soon as processing certification reach a certain stringencyDep Var: Sourcing from small producers
Diff-GMM OLS GLM Fixed effect Diff-GMM
(4a) (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b)
0.240** 0.157*** 0.196*** 0.094** 0.092**
(0.111) (0.038) (0.042) (0.036) (0.044)
0.141** 0.03 0.037 0.077* 0.043
(0.069) (0.049) (0.046) (0.043) (0.067)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
– Yes – – –
– 0.111 – 0.222 –
391 485 485 485 391
49 – – – 49
0.857 – – – 0.098
0.514 – – – 0.514
Table 7
Regression results – low versus high stringency certification.
Dep Var: Sourcing from all producers Dep Var: Sourcing from small producers
OLS GLM Fixed effect Diff-GMM OLS GLM Fixed effect Diff-GMM
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b)
Production certification: baseline 0.014 0.070 0.026 0.021 0.02 0.639*** 0.065 0.108
(0.059) (0.065) (0.044) (0.456) (0.051) (0.123) (0.056) (0.502)
Production certification: high level 0.429*** 0.347*** 0.166*** 0.210** 0.163*** 0.218*** 0.092** 0.115**
(0.070) (0.049) (0.054) (0.104) (0.040) (0.052) (0.035) (0.055)
Processing certification: baseline 0.077 0.065 0.097 0.274* 0.037 0.054 0.141** 0.045
(0.048) (0.041) (0.064) (0.198) (0.054) (0.050) (0.062) (0.115)
Processing certification: high level 0.027 0.053 0.025 0.168* 0.100** 0.165** 0.005 0.014
(0.061) (0.055) (0.037) (0.088) (0.146) (0.083) (0.024) (0.079)
Company covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location dummies Yes – – – Yes – – –
R2 0.614 – 0.521 – 0.116 – 0.247 –
N 485 485 485 391 485 485 485 391
No. of collapsed IV’s – – – 55 – – – 55
2nd order autocorrelation – – – 0.912 – – – 0.925
Hansen Difference test – – – 0.938 – – – 0.938
Company cluster robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Average marginal effects (APE) are reported in columns 2a and 2b.
*** p < 0.01.
** p < 0.05.
* p < 0.1.
302 M. Schuster, M. Maertens / Food Policy 43 (2013) 291–305level, companies find it more convenient to vertically integrate, as
the need of guaranteeing quality and traceability outweigh the
requirements of filling the processing plant. The results in this sec-
tion highlight the fact that private standards are not a homoge-
neous entity and that different standards have very different
effects in supply chains. This issue of heterogeneity of private stan-
dards has largely been ignored in the existing empirical literature
on the impact of private standards.
Individual certificates
In a final analysis, we consider individual standards and esti-
mate the impact on sourcing from external producers and from
small producers. In Table 8 we estimate the impact of the four
most important certification schemes (certificates which at least
10% of firms comply to in 2011) and only report results from the
preferred Difference GMM estimator. Again, we see that differentTable 8
Regression results – by individual certification.
Dep Var: Sourcing from all p
Difference GMM
(1d)
Global Gap certification 0.191**
(0.084)
HACCP certification 0.186*
(0.112)
BRC certification 0.145*
(0.081)
BASC certification 0.227**
(0.098)
Company covariates Yes
Year dummies Yes
N 391
Number of collapsed IV’s 61
2nd order autocorrelation 0.954
Hansen Difference test 0.481
Company cluster robust standard errors in parenthesis.
⁄⁄⁄ p < 0.01.
** p < 0.05.
* p < 0.1.certification schemes can have very different effects on companies
sourcing strategy. Global Gap, the main production standard, sig-
nificantly decreases external sourcing and sourcing from small
farmers. The magnitude of the effects is similar to the magnitude
of the overall effects of certification (Tables 4 and 5) and produc-
tion certification (Table 6) – which might indicate that Global
Gap certification drives the overall results. Global Gap reduces gen-
eral external sourcing by 19 percentage points, corresponding to
36% reduced sourcing, and it reduces sourcing from small produc-
ers by almost twice as much, i.e., 68%. These findings are in line
with studies that have specifically focused on the impact of Global
Gap and reported decreased smallholder sourcing as a result of
Global Gap certification (e.g., Graffham et al., 2007; Kleinwechter
and Grethe, 2006; Lemeilleur, 2012; Subervie and Vagneron, 2013).
In addition, we find that the other most spread certificates
have positive and negative effects on sourcing behavior of firms
but results are only significant for all type of external producersroducers Dep Var: Sourcing from small producers
Difference GMM
(2d)
0.084**
(0.037)
0.064
(0.090)
0.023
(0.068)
0.048
(0.063)
Yes
Yes
391
61
0.152
0.295
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(baseline) processing standard, HACCP, has a positive, effect on
external sourcing from all types of suppliers while the coefficient
on the most spread (high level) processing standard, BRC, has an
opposite sign. This is in line with the results above that firms
amortize the costs related to the certification process until the
processing requirements become too stringent. BASC, a standard
that is mainly required by the US to protect themselves from
bioterrorism and drug trafficking, was not included in the anal-
yses in Production versus processing standards because of its
specific aim, but is adopted by a large share of companies. From
the analysis in Table 8 it is clear that certification to BASC also
significantly reduces sourcing from all types of producers, but
not from small producers. Unless the certification requirements
are thus relatively undemanding, certified companies explicitly
change their sourcing behavior and vertically integrate in order
to better monitor the entire value chain, but eventually keep
some relationships with small producers to flexibly adjust to
external demand fluctuations.Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed the impact of private food standards
on the exclusion or inclusion of independent large, medium and
small farms in the export supply chains of developing countries.
We have provided robust empirical evidence from the asparagus
export sector in Peru and conclude that private standards in gen-
eral reduce the share of produce that export companies source
from external and small-scale producers, thereby leading to in-
creased vertical integration. We believe that this is an important
finding and that our study is among the first to provide quantita-
tive evidence based on panel data methods on the impact of pri-
vate standards on the structure of export supply chains. Given
the large number of exporters in the Peruvian export sector and
the availability of panel data, we were able to better control for dy-
namic effects, selection bias and unobserved heterogeneity and to
more accurately estimate the impact of certification to private
standard schemes on companies sourcing strategies.
While most studies looked at the issue of exclusive supply
chains from the perspective of family farmers, we looked at the is-
sue from the perspective of export companies. This perspective
brings some important nuances in the debate. A first nuance is in
relative versus absolute numbers. We have shown that the relative
importance of all external producers and small farmers in export
production has decreased over time (and we have attributed this
decline to the impact of private standards) but that in absolute
terms the export volume that is sourced from external and small
farmers has continued to increase. A second nuance is in the form
of vertical integration that private standards induce. This could be
forward or downstream vertical integration by exporters into pri-
mary production but could also be backward or upstream vertical
integration by farmers into export activities. We have only ana-
lyzed the sourcing behavior of companies after they started involv-
ing in export activities and find evidence of backward integration.
In addition, due to the availability of detailed survey data on
companies’ certification to private standards, we were able to dis-
tinguish heterogeneous effects of different types of private stan-
dards. We find that production standards and high-level
standards increase vertically integrated production by export com-
panies and decrease sourcing from external producers while pro-
cessing standards and baseline standards reduce vertical
integration and increase external sourcing. While some other stud-
ies focused on the impact of individual certification schemes, no
previous studies have analyzed the effect of different standards
in a systematic way.We recognize that our case-study approach has limitations and
that our findings do not necessarily hold in other cases. The avail-
ability of land in arid coastal areas in Peru, public investment in
large irrigation schemes, favorable tax regimes for export compa-
nies and favorable labor laws for agro-export companies might
be important factors in the trend towards increased vertical inte-
gration in the asparagus sector. Also the long history of the aspar-
agus export sector and the fact that Peru already had an important
market share for asparagus in the international market before pri-
vate standards started to emerge and spread, might play a role. Ef-
fects of private standards on supply chains and the inclusion of
small producers might be different in more recent sectors, such
as African horticulture exports that boomed along with the rise
in private standards. Accurate research on private standards and
its effects on food supply chains in different developing countries
and contexts is still needed. Moreover, in this paper we have not
looked at standards addressing issues of broader social account-
ability, which are increasingly being adopted by export firms in
developing countries. There is thus room for future research to fo-
cus on the emerging role of social-issue standards, especially in
terms of labor market or environmental behavior effects.
Nevertheless, our findings – even if they would only hold in
middle-income, relative land-abundant countries and in well-
established export sectors – have important implications for public
policy and private investment. Developing country governments,
NGOs and other donors focus on the inclusion of smallholder farms
in lucrative export supply chains as part of a pro-poor development
policy. A common used strategy to increase smallholder participa-
tion in high-value export chains is to promote certification to pri-
vate standards and to assist smallholder farmers and export
companies to become certified. For example, the EU-funded Pesti-
cide Initiative Program (PIP) in ACP countries (Jaud and Cadot,
2012) and the USAID-funded Business and Market Expansion (BA-
MEX) project in Madagascar (Bignebat and Vagneron, 2011; Suber-
vie and Vagneron, 2013) assist exporters and farmers to comply
with private standards from overseas buyers. It has been docu-
mented, for example in the lychee sector in Madagascar (Bignebat
and Vagneron, 2011) and in the horticultural sector in Thailand
(Kersting and Wollni, 2013), that a large share of farmers who be-
came certified under such programs do not continue their certifi-
cates once financial support from the project stops. Given these
observations, our results that certification to private standers re-
duces companies’ sourcing from smallholder producers, put doubt
on the policy and donor strategies to promote certification to pri-
vate standards. Development programs that promote private certi-
fication and assist export firms and farmers with standards
compliance might even result in increased exclusion of small-
holder farmers from export chains and thereby defeat their own
development goals.Acknowledgements
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Table A1
List of food standards.
BASC Business Alliance for Secure Commerce http://www.wbasco.org/
BRC British Retail Consortium http://www.brc.org.uk
GAP Good Agricultural Practice http://www.ipeh.org/
Global Gap Global Good Agricultural Practice http://www.globalgap.org
GMP Good Manufacturing Practices http://www.gmp.com.pe/
HACCP Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point http://www.haccpalliance.org/
IFS International Food Standard http://www.ifs-certification.com
Leaf Linking Environment and Farming http://www.leafuk.org/
SQF 1000 Safe Quality Food Institute 1000 http://www.sqfi.com/
SQF 2000 Safe Quality Food Institute 2000 http://www.sqfi.com/
Tesco Tesco Nurture (Supermarket standard) http://www.tesco.com/nurture/
Table B1
Endogeneity check.
Indep Var Dep Variable
Percentage sourced from producers Certification Product certification Processing certification
(1a) (1b) (2) (3) (4)
Certification 0.090**
(0.040)
F.Certification 0.042
(0.058)
Production certification 0.132**
(0.050)
F.Production certification 0.009
(0.033)
Processing certification 0.01
(0.025)
F.Processing certification 0.023
(0.038)
L.Sourcing 0.067 0.285** 0.04
(0.193) (0.127) (0.134)
Constant 0.529 0.668* 3.646*** 4.057*** 2.125***
(0.338) (0.340) (0.894) (0.658) (0.803)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.128 0.156 0.426 0.513 0.273
N 536 536 537 537 537
Company cluster robust standard errors in parenthesis.
*** p < 0.01.
** p < 0.05.
* p < 0.1.
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Table A1.Appendix
Both a potential ‘anticipation effect’, i.e., a behavioral change of
companies in reaction to future certification plans, or a ‘response
effect’, i.e., the fact that firms seek certification in response to
changes in pre-period sourcing strategies would invalidate the re-
sults from Eq. (1) estimated with fixed effects. We decide to test for
the endogeneity and anticipation assumptions by including the
lead of the certification variable as a regressor in Eq. (1) and by
inverting the equation to analyze the effects of one period lagged
sourcing strategies on the decision of certification. Results are
shown in Table A1. After conditioning on the other regressors
and unobserved effects, we see that leads of the certification vari-
ables are never significant, which rules out an ‘anticipation effect’
of certification. The lagged sourcing strategy however shows a sig-
nificant impact on the decision to seek certification to production
standards. A negative past shocks to sourcing therefore positively
affects the likelihood of certification, which indicates that thecertification estimates from the fixed effects models in columns 2
are likely to be negatively biased. This calls for the use of a GMM
estimator, eliminating firm heterogeneities by at the same time
controlling for the endogeneity of certification (see Table B1).References
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